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Abstract 
Dual process models of cognition suggest that there are two types of thought: (1) autonomous 
Type 1 processes, and (2) working memory dependent Type 2 processes that support 
hypothetical thinking. Models of creative thinking also distinguish between two sets of thinking 
processes: those involved in the generation of ideas, and those involved with their refinement, 
evaluation and/or selection. Here we review dual process models in both these literatures and 
delineate the similarities and differences. Both generative and evaluative creative processing 
involve elements that have been attributed to each of the dual processes of cognition. We 
explore the notion that creative thinking may rest upon the nature of a shifting process 
between Type 1 & 2 dual processes. We suggest that a synthesis of the evidence bases on dual 
process models of cognition and of creative thinking, together with developing time-based 
approaches to explore the shifting process, could better inform the development of 
interventions to facilitate creativity. 
 
 
Keywords: creativity, dual process model, associative thought, analytic thought, Type 1 and 
Type 2 thinking 
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Dual Process Models of Cognition 
The notion that there are different types of thought processes extends at least back to 
the Ancient Greeks who distinguished between intellectual intuition and knowledge received by 
the senses. The nature of intuition and the distinction between sensory knowledge and 
reasoning also preoccupied later philosophers such as Descartes, Locke, Kant, Bergeson, and 
Russell (see Frankish, 2010). More recently, Cognitive Psychology has provided increasing 
evidence of two kinds of thinking processes and has made significant progress towards 
understanding their nature and operation (Evans, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Frankish, 
2010; Stanovich & Toplak, 2012). In one early formulation, Stanovich (1999) distinguished 
between ‘System 1’ and ‘System 2’ thinking.  System 1 was conceptualised as corresponding to 
intuitive processing whilst System 2 was viewed as reflective. However, use of the terms 
Systems 1 and 2 has been discouraged (e.g. Evans, 2008) because they imply singular entities 
that are not supported by research (e.g. Glöckner and Witteman, 2010). Moreover, Stanovich 
(2004, 2009) subsequently decomposed System 1 into The Autonomous Set of Systems (TASS) 
that have in common their fast, automatic, unconscious nature, but which differ in their diverse 
foci, and decomposed System 2 into the reflective and algorithmic minds. 
Later accounts speak in terms of ‘Type 1’ and ‘Type 2’ thinking processes (e.g. Evans, 
2008; 2009). As theorists attempted to synthesise the work of different authors (e.g. Evans, 
2003, 2008; Smith and DeCoster, 2000; Stanovich, 1999) an increasingly elaborated set of 
features was associated with each type of thinking. Type 1 processes were described as rapid, 
nonconscious, automatic, and associative in nature, corresponding to our gut reactions and 
intuitions. They were seen as high capacity, able to rapidly combine (or associate) information 
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that has been implicitly stored in memory, over long time periods, with sensory information 
from the current context without effortful thinking and intervention; that is, they are reflexive. 
Type 1 processes have been regarded as contributing to experience-based decision making and 
have been considered as largely independent of cognitive ability.  They are often thought to 
lead to biased responses. In contrast, Type 2 processes have been described as slow, controlled, 
effortful, conscious, and analytic. Thinking using these processes has been seen as capacity 
limited and rule based, applying these rules explicitly to current information; that is, it is 
reflective. Responses based on Type 2 processes are often regarded as normative and rational, 
as contributing to consequential decision making, and as correlated with cognitive ability. 
However, the burgeoning list of features associated with Type 1 and 2 processes has led 
to a range of criticisms of dual process accounts including that the range of features ascribed to 
each type of thinking process are imperfectly aligned to each other and the overarching 
processes (Keren & Schul, 2009) and that an alternative rule-based, unisystem model can 
explain human judgement (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011). In response to these criticisms, 
Evans and Stanovich (2013) suggested that there are just a few characteristics that differentiate 
Type 1 and Type 2 thought: Type 1 processes are autonomous and do not require working 
memory, whilst Type 2 processes require working memory and are ‘cognitively decoupled’ to 
prevent real world representations from becoming confused with mental simulations, thereby 
supporting hypothetical thinking (see also Stanovich & Toplak, 2012).  They suggested that the 
larger feature sets previously associated with Type 1 vs 2 thought should be regarded as 
frequent correlates, not defining characteristics; that is they are neither necessary nor sufficient 
(Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Stanovich & Toplak, 2012).   
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A further issue is how the two types of processes interact. According to what Evans 
(2008) terms a “default interventionist” theory, Type 1 processes provide fast, preconscious 
information to working memory that is used to guide behaviour by default, unless analytic 
reasoning intervenes (e.g. Evans, 2006; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). According to what Evans 
terms a “parallel-competitive” theory, implicit knowledge from Type 1 processes and explicit 
knowledge from Type 2 processes compete to control behaviour (e.g., Sloman, 1996; Smith & 
DeCoster, 2000). A third process may control the shift between Type 1 and Type 2 thinking 
(Evans, 2009; Stanovich, 2009). Use of type 1 and 2 thought may vary as a function of 
disposition, such that some individuals are more inclined to use Type 1 processes and others 
Type 2 processes (e.g., Epstein, 2003; Stanovich, 1999). We contend that the nature of the 
interaction between Type 1 and 2 processes may be a key source of individual differences in 
creative thinking ability and of variation in creative thinking across time by a given individual. 
Before we consider how this interaction might influence creative thinking we consider the 
relationship between dual process models of cognition in general and dual process models of 
creativity specifically.  
Dual Processes in Creative Thinking 
Allen and Thomas (2011) illustrated that both Type 1 and 2 processes are implicated at 
each of a five-stage model of creative thinking, the origins of which can be seen in Wallas’ 
(1926) four-stage description of the creative process. Here we draw back from Allen and 
Thomas’ five stages to focus on just two  fundamental processes of creative thinking 
emphasised in many recent models: developing ideas and evaluating them. This allows us to 
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survey the wide range of theories of creative thinking that incorporate these two processes and 
thereby to explore the extent to which they map onto Type 1 and 2 thinking processes.  
Our emphasis on idea generation and evaluation in creative thinking can be traced to 
contemporary definitions of creativity. Kaufman and Sternberg (2010, p. xiii) focus on the 
creative outcome and suggest that a creative response must be “novel, good, and relevant”. 
Others add that creative responses should also be surprising (Boden, 2004; Simonton, 2012). 
Further definitions of creativity include emphasis on the internal creative process (Plucker, 
Beghetto & Dow, 2004, Gabora, 2010a) and the external social context (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996, 
Plucker, Beghetto & Dow, 2004). Despite these varying views, most contemporary researchers 
agree on a generic definition that creative outcomes must be both original and of value within a 
given domain. Whilst, generative processes are required to formulate original ideas, evaluative 
processes are required to select and/or refine those ideas into a form that is of value (see also 
Howard-Jones & Murray, 2003) 
The evaluative phase may incorporate convergent thinking, the process of homing in on 
a single solution. However, an assumption underlying several measures of creativity (e.g. the 
Alternate Uses Test and the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking) is that creativity requires only 
divergent thinking; the generation of many different ideas. In addition, Epstein (2003) located 
creativity in just one type of thinking process in his Cognitive-Experiential Self Theory (CEST) of 
personality. This posits two information-processing systems: an experiential system that maps 
onto Type 1 processes, and a rational system that maps onto Type 2 processes. Epstein 
suggests that creativity is a product of the experiential system because it can use associations 
to generate ideas while a linear-processing rational system cannot. In support, an experiential 
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thinking style was positively correlated with performance on divergent thinking tests (Norris & 
Epstein, 2011). However, scoring of these tests focused on fluency—how many creative ideas 
are generated—whilst neglecting assessment of the extent to which the responses were of 
value, even though scoring of divergent thinking tests can be readily adapted to include 
measurement of the value of ideas (see Silvia, 2008). To produce responses that are valuable, it 
seems reasonable that analytic Type 2 processes would be required emphasising the need for 
dual process models of creativity. 
Most other models of creative thinking do include the dual processes of generation and 
evaluation and we next review key models, starting with the work of Guilford (1950, 1956), to 
examine their relationship to each other and to dual process models of cognition. While dual 
process models of creativity frequently appeal to the language of dual process models of 
cognition (e.g. Gabora & Aerts, 2009; Howard-Jones & Murray, 2003; Kaufman, 2011) these two 
sets of dual processes cannot always be straightforwardly mapped onto each other.  
Guilford’s (1956) Structure of Intellect Model, distinguished between divergent and 
convergent thinking processes and can be viewed as an initial, contemporary dual process 
model of creative thinking. Several authors have suggested that divergent processes are 
associative in character, such that items encoded in memory are combined with information 
from the current context in a state of defocused attention (Gabora, 2010a; Martindale, 1999). 
Conversely, convergent processes are seen as analytic in character, and thought to 
predominate in the refinement and evaluation of solutions. Thus, in some respects divergent 
and convergent thinking appear to map neatly onto typical correlates of Type 1 and  2 
processes. However, there are important differences. Although divergent thinking may be 
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spontaneous and associative in nature, with solutions sometimes appearing in a flash of insight, 
performance on divergent thinking tasks can involve processes that are effortful and deliberate 
(e.g., Ward, 1994). This could imply that divergent thinking does not map neatly onto Type 1 
processes (Frankish, 2010). Furthermore, experiencing a flash of insight indicates convergence 
on an initial idea or solution that is ripe for testing and/or development but this may arrive 
during an autonomous incubation process (see Wallas, 1926) logically implying that convergent 
thinking can arise from Type 1 as well as Type 2 processes. Thus, a simple mapping of divergent 
thinking onto Type 1 and convergent thinking onto Type 2 processes is not possible. 
Basadur, Graen and Green (1982; see also Basadur, 1995) propose the notion of 
ideation-evaluation cycles. They distinguish between three major stages in the creative thinking 
process — problem finding, problem solving, and solution implementation — and suggest that 
ideation and evaluation are involved at each stage in varying degree according to the domain. 
For instance, domains that emphasise problem finding have a high ratio of ideation to 
evaluation, whereas domains that emphasise solution implementation show the converse. 
Their emphasis on cycling between ideation and evaluation has parallels with the proposal of 
Allen and Thomas (2011) that Type 1 and 2 processes are involved at each stage of creative 
thinking. Basadur et al’s work begs the question of how successfully individuals can cycle 
between ideation and evaluation but is not framed at a level that helps us understand the 
fundamental mechanisms of ideation and evaluation or their relationship to dual process 
models of cognition. 
An early, more mechanistic, conception of the dual processes of creative thinking is the 
“Blind-Variation-and-Selective-Retention” model (BVSR; Campball, 1960). Simonton (1999, 
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2007, 2010, 2011, 2012, in press) elaborated this into a Darwinian theory of creativity. BVSR 
proposes that we generate new ideas through a trial-and-error process involving ‘blind’ 
generation of ideational variants followed by selective retention of the fittest variants for 
development into a final product. The variants are referred to as ‘blind’ because the creator has 
no subjective certainty about whether they are a step in the direction of the final creative 
result. Further, they are viewed as independent of the environment, each other, and of their 
likelihood of selection.  
There is an intuitive appeal to BVSR; as do biological species, creative ideas exhibit the 
kind of complexity and adaptation over time that is indicative of an evolutionary process, both 
when they are expressed to others, and in the mind of a single creator (Gabora, 1997; Terrell, 
Hunt & Gosden, 1997; Thagard, 1980; Tomasello 1996). However, numerous problems have 
been identified with BVSR as a conceptual framework for creativity (Dasgupta, 2004; Eysenck, 
1995; Gabora, 2005, 2007, 2010b, 2011; Sternberg, 1998; Weisberg, 2004).  
Nevertheless, BVSR has interesting features such as Campbell’s conception that selection 
operates through “exploration of a substitute representation of the environment the solution 
being selected from the multifarious exploratory thought trials”. This conception clearly relates 
to the ‘cognitive decoupling’ of Type 2 thinking (Stanovich & Toplak, 2012). However, 
Campbell’s discounting of the role of the environment in  idea generation does not sit well with 
findings that Type 1 processes often combine current contextual information with prior 
knowledge (Evans, 2008). Further, the assumption of BVSR that successively generated ideas 
are unrelated is contradicted by empirical studies. For instance, Nijstad & Stroebe (2006) show 
that when participants generate ideas for problems, such as “what can everybody do to 
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improve or maintain one’s own health”, temporal clusters of semantically related ideas occur 
(see also Feinstein, 2006). 
A dual process theory of creativity that is consistent with these findings is Finke, Ward 
and Smith’s (1992) Genoplore model, which divides creative thinking into two overarching 
stages of idea generation and exploration. These are further subdivided into smaller stages with 
multiple operations available at each stage. For instance, generation can involve retrieval of 
items from memory, formation of associations between items, and synthesis and 
transformation of the resultant ‘pre-inventive’ structures. Exploration can involve identifying 
the attributes of these pre-inventive structures and considering their potential function in 
different contexts. Evidence for this model comes from findings that when people generate 
ideas they appear to make use of exemplars from the same or a related domain and they 
endow the new idea with many of the attributes of the previous exemplar. For instance, 
participants endow imaginary alien creatures from a planet very different to earth with typical 
features of animals on earth, such as arms and/or legs (Ward, 1994). Ward refers to this 
process as the path of least resistance (see also Ward & Kolomyts, 2010). 
The Genoplore model can be partially mapped onto dual process models of cognition, 
with the generative phase corresponding to Type 1 processes and the exploration of pre-
inventive structures corresponding to Type 2 processes. However, analytic processes may give 
rise to new ideas and insights (Finke, 1996). Thus, the generation phase appears to involve both 
Type 1 and 2 processes whereas the exploration phase is consistent with Type 2 processes 
alone.  
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The ‘Honing Theory’ of creativity (Gabora, 2005, in prep.) also posits that people draw 
on past knowledge when generating new possibilities, expanding on Mednick’s (1962) work on 
flat associative hierarchies. Mednick found that whereas most people have rather steep 
associative hierarchies (i.e., a given stimulus evokes only highly related items in memory), 
creative people have flat associative hierarchies (i.e., a given stimulus evokes not just highly 
related but also remotely related items). Gabora proposes that creative people spontaneously 
enter a state of flattened associative hierarchies during idea generation (Gabora 2010a; see 
also Martindale, 1995), and that refinement of an idea occurs through iterative interaction 
between the current conception of the idea and the individual’s internal model of the world, or 
‘worldview’. Creativity then arises through the joint effects of associative and analytic types of 
thought and the process of shifting between them in response to task demands (for related 
views see also Howard-Jones, 2002; Martindale, 1999; Vartanian, Martindale & Kwiatkowski, 
2007). In this view, the activation of flattened associative hierarchies, when presented with a 
task requiring a creative response, facilitates the forging of connections between more remote 
attributes of ideas and concepts in a contextually bounded way that contrasts with the BVSR 
view that creative generation is independent of context. The ideas that result from the 
associative process described by Gabora are then honed by an analytic process characterised by 
‘spiky’ neural activation functions. Thinking becomes more focused on core aspects of the idea 
and can involve logically testing and elaborating the idea into a final solution, which is likely to 
require the cognitive decoupling of Type 2 processes.  
 Gabora’s theory of creativity addresses criticisms of BVSR by accounting for observed 
effects of context and expertise on creative thinking (e.g., Howard-Jones & Murray, 2003; 
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Vincent, Decker & Mumford, 2002) and gets us closer to an understanding of the fundamental 
mechanisms underlying creative thought, but there are still aspects to work out. The theory 
emphasises the importance of the ability to shift from an analytic to an associative type of 
thought when stuck in a rut, and from an associative to an analytic process following insight, 
and computer models have shown this shifting to be effective (DiPaola & Gabora, 2007, 2009; 
Gabora, Chia & Firouzi, 2013; Gabora & DiPaola, 2012). However, there has been little empirical 
investigation of this shifting in humans.  
Further, whilst associative and analytic thinking processes appear to be closely related 
to Type 1 and 2 thinking, their recruitment may be different. In dual process models of 
cognition, Type 1 processes either govern behaviour by default or in competition with Type 2 
processes. However, the nature of the relationship between these types of process in creative 
thinking may be different. For example, creative thinking may be characterised by shifting from 
analytic to associative thinking as suggested in Howard-Jones’ (2002) Dual-State model of 
creative cognition. Howard-Jones suggests that a key barrier to creativity is the notion of 
‘fixation’ (the tendency to rely on previous ideas when generating new ones; cf. Maier, 1931), 
and proposes strategies to help shift individuals from secondary process, analytical thinking to 
primary process associative thinking. At present, Gabora’s theory is uncommitted to where on 
the spectrum from associative to analytic the ‘default’ starting point falls when thinking 
creatively, and acknowledges that the default point may vary across individuals (see also 
Basadur et al. 1982; Basadur, 1995; Epstein, 2003; Stanovich, 1999). It seems likely that work on 
dual process models of cognition could usefully contribute to exploring the process of shifting 
between Type 1 and 2 thinking processes in the context of creative thinking. 
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 Another recent dual process theory of creative thinking, proposed by Nijstad, De Dreu, 
Rietzschel and Baas (2010), suggests that creativity can arise through two pathways: a flexibility 
pathway and a persistence pathway. Greater cognitive flexibility is viewed as generating more 
categories of ideas, and as more frequent shifting between them, which Nijstad et al. argue can 
lead to greater originality. Thus, the flexibility pathway appears to relate to dual-process 
models of creativity, such as BVSR, that have suggested that multiple idea variants are 
generated. However, they argue that exploring a few content categories in depth may also lead 
to increased originality. Given its focus on a few categories of idea, the persistence pathway 
appears to relate to other models of creativity that focus on developing ideas, such as Honing 
Theory. However, the flexibility and persistence model is different from these previous models 
in that it strongly emphasises deliberative processing under conscious executive control. Indeed 
Nijstad et al. (p43) state “our model is not applicable to situations in which creativity occurs 
‘‘spontaneously’’ without intentional effort”. In essence, they argue that the creative thinking 
described by their model is primarily a product of Type 2 processes. However, they note that 
the degree of executive control differs between their two pathways. The flexibility pathway 
uses broad and inclusive cognitive categories, flexibly shifts among categories, approaches, and 
sets, and establishes more remote associations. The authors suggest that, in the case of 
individuals with high mental ability, this may be helped by reduced latent inhibition, which 
allows more distant associates and ideas to enter working memory. Such individuals may have 
the necessary cognitive control to benefit from reduced inhibition because they are also able to 
evaluate and identify the inevitable proportion of poor solutions that result if more are allowed. 
The persistence pathway achieves creative outcomes through a systematic and effortful 
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exploration of possibilities and an in depth exploration of only a few categories or perspectives. 
These systematic processes are likely to start with readily available solutions. Less obvious, 
more original, solutions only arrive if the individual persists in generating more ideas within a 
category. Because systematic search is involved in this pathway they argue that higher levels of 
executive control are required than for the flexibility pathway. When persisting, individuals will 
be less distractible, but also less flexible because more distant associates are filtered out. 
Nijstad et al. note that because the persistence pathway reduces flexibility it might 
appear to be negatively related to the flexibility pathway. However, they argue that this is not 
the case because individuals can shift from a flexible mode, where they discover new and 
promising approaches to a task, to a systematic, persistent mode where they further explore 
these approaches. In describing this shifting process the distinction from previous ‘generate 
and explore’ models is somewhat lost. It again appears that creativity may most likely result 
from the joint operation of both pathways such that the flexibility pathway helps with the 
development of originality and the persistence pathway with the elaboration of ideas into 
those that will prove useful. As such the pathways might not appear conceptually to be 
independent ‘dual-routes’ but necessarily coupled stages in a creative thinking process, much 
as proposed in other work. However, arguing against this, Nijstad et al (pers. com.) find that the 
correlation between their measure of flexibility – the number of categories generated – and 
their measure of persistence - the within category fluency (average number of ideas per 
category/total number of ideas generated) – decreases over time. This might suggest that on a 
given task, rather than shifting between pathways individuals become increasingly entrenched 
in the processing associated with one pathway over time. 
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Nijstad et al. provide a meta-analysis of the relationship between their measures of 
flexibility and persistence on the originality and feasibility of creative ideas. They find a 
correlation of 0.36 between flexibility and originality that is much stronger than the correlation 
of 0.12 between within-category-fluency (persistence) and originality. This suggests that the 
flexibility pathway is more strongly implicated in the overall originality of ideas, although 
Nijstad et al cite evidence that the relationship between within-category-fluency and originality 
increases for the originality of ideas within a particular category (Rietzschel, 2005; Rietzschel, 
Nijstad & Stroebe, 2007). This latter finding somewhat strengthens the argument that 
persistence can indeed increase originality, but still overall originality is much more strongly 
related to flexibility than to persistence. In addition, Nijstad et al find no factors that 
significantly correlate with feasibility of ideas other than originality, which is negatively 
correlated. This, coupled with a greater emphasis on measures of originality, leaves somewhat 
unaddressed in their model the question of how creative ideas that are both original and of 
value come about. One possibility arises from examination of the effects of mood state on 
creativity. De Dreu, Baas & Nijstad (2008) find that negative activating mood states enhance 
persistence, which they argue should benefit within category fluency. However, another 
possibility is that negative activating mood states also improve the evaluation of creative ideas 
as observed by Sowden & Dawson (2011) thereby enhancing their value. 
In summary, Nijstad et al provide strong evidence for a flexibility pathway that 
promotes creativity through increasing the originality of ideas, but the evidence for the impact 
of a second persistence pathway on originality is weaker, nor does persistence relate to the 
feasibility (value) of ideas. The factors predicting the latter are largely unexplained by their 
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model. Thus again, whilst dual process models of cognition clearly relate to Nijstad et al’s ideas, 
the mapping is not straightforward. There appears to be a clear relationship between correlates 
of Type 1 processes and the flexibility pathway in that both may be associative in character, but 
the flexibility pathway also involves deliberative processing, a Type 2 process, and evaluation of 
ideas by an “idea monitor” to keep them on track. Monitoring and cognitive control are viewed 
as one component of Type 2 processing (e.g. the ‘reflective mind’  of Stanovich, 2009), as a 
separate Type 3 process (Evans, 2009) or as a product of metacognitive processes (Thompson, 
2009). Further, although both Type 2 processes and the persistence pathway are hypothesised 
to make strong use of working memory, the persistence pathway does not appear to contribute 
to the feasibility of creative ideas whereas a key function associated with Type 2 processes is 
evaluation facilitated by cognitive decoupling. 
In summary, we have looked at two sets of dual process models: general cognitive 
models and models of creative thinking. Table 1 summarizes the various elements of these 
models and the relationships between them. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
It is clear that both idea generation and evaluation may recruit Type 1 and 2 processes, 
and this might suggest the possibility of a four-component model of creative thinking. Although 
this cannot be ruled out, some recent models of creative thinking do align quite parsimoniously 
with Dual Process models of cognition, particularly Howard Jones’ Dual State model (2002) and 
Gabora’s Honing Theory (2005, in prep.). Nevertheless, the question of how Type 1 and 2 
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processes interact in creative thinking remains largely unanswered. Although there is general 
agreement that shifting between the different processes is required for creative ideas to 
develop (e.g. Basadur, 1982; Basadur et al., 1985; Finke et al., 1992; Gabora & Ranjan, 2013; 
Howard-Jones 2002; Nijstad et al., 2010), it is not known whether this is different when thinking 
creatively, how it varies across individuals, and whether it could be trained. These issues are 
discussed in the next sections. 
Cognitive mechanisms of shifting between creative thinking processes 
Dual-process models of creative thinking make different predictions concerning the 
extent to which creative thinking processes operate in series or in parallel. The dual-stage 
models of Basadur (1995), Howard-Jones (2002), Finke et al. (1992) and the theory of the 
emergence of a creative insight proposed by Gabora and Ranjan (2013) suggest shifting 
between types of thinking occurs in series. However, Nijstad et al’s (2010) dual-pathway model 
suggests that an ‘idea monitor’, a mechanism that evaluates ideas, continually checks the 
outputs of idea generation processes in a similar fashion to type 2 processes in default-
interventionist dual-process accounts of cognition (Evans, 2008; Stanovich, 2009; Frankish, 
2010) or Type 3 processes in Evans’ (2009) hybrid model. This suggests that individuals have the 
mode (or Type) of thinking supporting evaluation available ‘‘on tap’ and can apply it to keep 
idea generation in check. While not necessarily implying that the two types of thinking operate 
in parallel, Nijstad et al.’s (2010) model does suggest that generation and evaluation work more 
in unison than in the aforementioned serial models. Serial models can be interpreted as 
implying that it is necessary to disengage one type of thought prior to engaging the other, or to 
shift along the continuum between analytic to associative thinking (Gabora & Ranjan, 2013).  
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Different models also propose different mechanisms that enable shifting between types 
of thinking. Nijstad et al. (2010) propose that executive control underlies thinking within both 
pathways but lower cognitive control is applied in the flexibility pathway when broadening 
one’s attention, while higher cognitive control is applied in the persistence pathway to support 
systematic search. It has also been suggested that shifting between types of thinking involves 
differentially adjusting the focus of attention based on the demands of the task at hand 
(Gabora, 2003; Vartanian, Martindale & Matthews, 2009).  
Further, there may be a link between the mechanism responsible for adjustments in 
cognitive control and the mechanism responsible for adjusting attentional focus. For instance, 
Kaufman (2011) suggests that, during generative thinking, unconscious cognitive processes 
activated through defocused attention are more prevalent, whereas, during exploratory 
thinking, controlled cognition activated by focused attention becomes more prevalent. There is 
evidence that creative individuals are better able to alter this focus of attention in response to 
task demands by modulating cognitive inhibition (Ansburg & Hill, 2003; Bristol & Viskontas, 
2006; Dorfman, Martindale, Gassimova & Vartanian, 2008; Gabora, 2000, 2003; Vartanian, 
Martindale & Kwiatkowski, 2007). In addition, shifting between these processes may be more 
effectively applied by creative individuals over the course of a creative task (Gilhooly, Fiortou, 
Anthony & Wynn, 2007; Vartanian, Martindale & Kwiatkowski, 2003). However, there is debate 
about whether shifting happens automatically or under top-down control (Vartanian, 
Martindale & Matthews, 2009). Perhaps, as Vartanian, Martindale & Matthews (2009) suggest, 
both top-down and automatic bottom-up processes drive adjustments in the focus of attention, 
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and whether this mechanism is under conscious control or not, depends on what stage of the 
task one is at. 
Neurobiological mechanisms of shifting between thinking processes 
Moving to a neurobiological level of explanation, one potential candidate for a shifting 
mechanism is the ‘salience network’ proposed by Menon & Uddin (2010). The salience network 
incorporates the Anterior Insula and the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC). The ACC has been 
shown to become active shortly before an insightful solution is reached (Kounios & Beeman, 
2009) consistent with it playing a role in the shift from autonomous generative processing to 
conscious validation. Menon & Uddin (2010) propose that this network serves to shift between 
a Default Mode Network (DMN) and a Central Executive Network (CEN; see also Raichle, 
MacLeod, Snyder, Powers, Gusnard & Shulman, 2001; Fox, Snyder, Vincent, Corbetta, Van Essen 
& Raichle, 2005). They summarise evidence that the DMN shows decreases in activity during 
cognitively demanding tasks and includes brain regions involved in self-referential and social-
cognitive processing, and in processing episodic and autobiographical memory. It has been 
further suggested that this retrieval of information from memory, both personal and general 
may facilitate solving problems and developing future plans (Greicius, Krasnow, Reiss & Menon, 
2003). Thus, the function of the DMN might appear to bear some relationship to the associative 
processes involved in the generation of creative ideas (see Buckner, Andrews-Hanna & 
Schacter, 2008). Conversely, CEN activity increases during cognitively demanding tasks and has 
been linked to maintaining and manipulating information in working memory and making 
judgements and decisions. Thus, the CEN may play a role in the analysis and evaluation of 
creative ideas and Type 2 thinking processes. Further, the CEN is closely aligned anatomically 
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and functionally with a reflective C network proposed by Lieberman, Gaunt, Gilbert, and Trope 
(2002; see also Lieberman, Jarcho & Satpute, 2004) whilst the DMN shares some overlap in 
brain regions with a reflexive, X network proposed by Lieberman et al. (2002; 2004). However, 
the latter are not perfectly aligned anatomically and whether they are functionally aligned is 
not yet clear in the literature. The X-network is linked with associative learning that occurs 
without conscious intention and with intuition-based self-knowledge (Lieberman et al., 2002, 
2004), which bears some relation to conceptions of the DMN. However, whereas episodic 
memory retrieval is seen as part of the DMN it is seen as a key aspect of the C network by 
Lieberman et al. (2004). Further illustrating the complexity of the relationship between 
generative and evaluative thinking, and the underlying brain mechanisms, a recent fMRI study 
by Ellamil, Dobson, Beeman & Christoff (2012) found that the default mode network and the 
central executive network were both activated during evaluation of creative ideas but not 
during creative generation. The latter was associated with activation of the medial temporal 
lobes, which supports memory retrieval during creative generation. 
Clearly there is much to be worked out in the mapping between brain networks, the 
processes of creative thinking and dual process models of cognition.  However, the consistent 
involvement of the ACC in shifting between types of thinking suggests that ACC activation could 
be a useful marker to identify shifting as participants work on creative problems. This could 
afford us a way to compare the timing and frequency of shifting between more and less 
creative problem solvers and solutions. 
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Exploring the time course of shifting 
The possibility that patterns of shifting differ across stages of the creative process 
(Basadur, 1995) and individuals (Vartanian et al, 2007) suggests that the relationship between 
creativity and shifting is an important avenue for further research. Factors such as frequency of 
shifts, the length of using one process before a shift, and differences in patterns or the nature 
of shifting could be examined. Further, individual differences in trait dispositions to engage in 
different modes or styles of thinking have also been proposed (Basadur et al. 1982; Basadur, 
1995; Epstein, 2003; Kaufman, 2011; Norris & Epstein, 2011; Stanovich, 1999). Time based 
approaches would allow us to compare whether these trait differences affect the timing of the 
shifting process. 
General chronological information can be gained through methods such as think aloud 
protocols (e.g. Khandwalla, P. N., 1993; Gilhooly et al., 2007; Pringle & Sowden, in prep). 
However, the identification of neurobiological markers of the shift between Type 1 and 2 
processes, such as ACC activation, may afford us the opportunity to develop more powerful 
chronometric methods that explore the precise time at which shifts occur for, say, more vs less 
creative respondents. For example, recent advances in EEG speech research that deal with the 
problem of motor artifacts in the EEG speech signal (De Vos, Riès, Vanderperren, Vanrumster, 
Alario, Huffel & Burle, 2010) may mean it is now possible to combine EEG (e.g. Martindale & 
Hasenfus, 1978; Fink & Benedek, in press), fMRI and think aloud approaches to study shifting 
when thinking creatively. By using these methods conjointly it may be possible to lock events in 
the creative process to patterns of neural activity exhibited by an individual while they are 
engaged in a creative act.  
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Developing an understanding of the chronology and chronometrics of shifting should 
facilitate the development of methods to help people optimise when to shift in order to 
maximise creative output. 
Implications for training creative thinking 
Methods for training creativity have tended to focus on just one component such as 
divergent thinking (Scott, Leritz & Mumford, 2004). However, given the evidence that creativity 
involves an interaction between thinking processes (Basadur, 1995; Finke, 1996; Gabora & 
Ranjan, 2013; Howard-Jones 2002; Nijstad et al., 2010), attempts to stimulate shifting between 
processes could be more effective. Stimulating shifting between different types of thinking to 
aid creativity could involve enhancing (1) the timing of shifting or (2) the ability to shift. For 
instance, an individual who is proficient at rapidly shifting between processes may not know 
when to shift. This is important because evidence suggests that a mismatch between the phase 
of the creative process and the type of thinking can negatively affect creative output (Jansson & 
Smith, 1991; Howard-Jones, 2002). Further, cycling too rapidly between thinking processes may 
result in ideas being prematurely evaluated leading to promising ideas being dismissed (Nijstad, 
et al., 2010; Zabelina & Beeman, 2013), whereas an individual who has a good understanding of 
when is the optimal time to shift might be better at allowing time for an idea to be sufficiently 
worked out before applying evaluative processes.  
The distinction between serial vs parallel models of creative thinking processes also has 
important implications for enhancing creative thinking. If shifting occurs in a serial fashion then 
creative thinking might be improved by focusing on improving the individual’s ability or 
tendency to shift between and/or to engage the optimal type of thinking for performance in a 
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particular phase of the creative process. The latter may align with the idea, from dual process 
theories of cognition, of a pre-emptive conflict resolution model in which the use of Type 1 or 2 
thinking processes is chosen at the start of a task (see Evans, 2007). On the other hand, if 
generation and evaluation occur in a more parallel fashion then it may be best to improve an 
individual’s evaluative ability and ensure that evaluative processes are quickly accessible ‘on 
tap’ alongside generative processes. It could be that both parallel and serial accounts are 
correct but that there are individual differences in the shifting mechanism. For example, more 
creative individuals may have evaluative processes ‘on tap’ and/or less creative individuals may 
shift more slowly between different processes in a serial fashion. 
There are also various ways by which shifting ability might be influenced. For instance, 
the creative thinking literature suggests that cues to environmental safety such as mood state 
or colour can influence the use of different thinking processes (De Dreu et al., 2008; Mehta & 
Zhu, 2009; Sowden & Dawson, 2011). Further, with different pathways conceptualised as 
engaging different levels of cognitive control (e.g. Nijstad et al., 2010), a means of aiding 
shifting between them could take the form of improving a person’s ability to flexibly modulate 
cognitive control as there is some evidence that creative people are better able to modulate 
cognitive control in response to context (Zabelina & Robinson, 2010). However, further work is 
needed to determine the extent to which cognitive control can be trained for the purposes of 
creative thinking. Encouragingly, work from the dual process of cognition framework indicates 
that instruction can influence the use of Type 2 processes (e.g. Evans, Allen, Newstead, & 
Pollard, 1994). In addition, work from dual process theories suggests that meta-cognitive 
factors such as the ‘feeling’ and ‘judgment of rightness’ may influence the engagement of Type 
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2 processes (Thompson, 2009). Work to explore ways to influence these meta-cognitions may 
benefit the development of methods to assist the ability to shift between types of creative 
thinking process. 
Finally, the direction of shifting between thinking processes may be important. For 
example, Howard-Jones (2002) argues that individuals evidencing a disposition to think more 
analytically may benefit from interventions which focus on enabling them to shift to a more 
associative type of thinking while those evidencing a disposition to think more associatively 
may benefit from interventions that enable them to shift to a more self-critical, analytical style 
of thinking (Howard-Jones, 2002).  Further research is necessary to examine if such trait 
differences interact with the process of shifting between types of thinking process. 
Summary and Conclusions 
There appears to be consensus amongst different dual-process models of creativity on 
the importance of generative and evaluative processes, and the interaction between them, 
during creative thinking. However, different models conceptualise this in different ways. The 
time is ripe to develop an integrated dual-process model of creativity that clearly specifies the 
nature of this interaction across different points in the creative process, and the mechanisms 
that underlie shifting between generative and evaluative thinking. An important part of this 
process will be to incorporate findings from more general dual-process theories of cognition. By 
understanding the relationship between Type 1 and Type 2 thought on the one hand, and the 
processes of generation and evaluation in creativity on the other, we can elaborate our 
understanding of creativity and its underlying biological mechanisms. This is expected to 
facilitate development of interventions to enhance creative thinking. In future studies it would 
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be useful to investigate (1) the extent to which creativity is determined by the ability to shift 
between Type 1 & 2 thinking processes as a function of the circumstances and the stage of the 
creative process, and (2) whether shifts in generation-evaluation ratios and their timing can be 
used to enhance creative thinking. Time-based approaches will be essential to explore these 
patterns of shifting between processes whilst thinking creatively. 
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Table 1. Comparison of the characteristics of Type 1 and Type 2 processes with dual process 
models of creative thought. For instance, the table shows that Type 1 processes may contribute 
to both convergent and divergent thinking in Guilford’s (1956) Structure of Intellect model and 
that Type 2 processes contribute to both generation and exploration of ideas in Finke et al.’s 
(1992) Genoplore model. 
 Dual process models of cognition (Evans, 2008; Frankish, 
2010; Stanovich & Toplak, 2012; Evans & Stanovich, 2013) 
 
Dual process model of 
creativity 
Type 1 (autonomous) 
processes 
Type 2 (working memory 
based and cognitively 
decoupled) processes 
Cognitive Experiential Self 
Theory (Epstein, 2003) 
Experiential (divergent) 
thinking 
 
Structure of Intellect 
(Guilford, 1956) 
Divergent thinking 
Convergent thinking 
Divergent thinking 
Convergent thinking  
Ideation – Evaluation cycles 
(Basadur et al., 1982; Basadur, 
1985) 
Mapping unclear Mapping unclear 
Blind Variation and Selective 
Retention (Campbell, 1960; 
Simonton, 2011) 
Variation (but context effects 
excluded) 
Selection 
Genoplore (Finke et al., 1992) Generation Exploration 
Generation 
Dual State Model (Howard-
Jones, 2002) 
Generative Analytical 
Honing Theory (Gabora, 2005) Associative Analytic 
Dual Pathway Model (Nijstad 
et al., 2010) 
 Flexibility 
Persistence 
 
